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Moral Values Are Associated with Individual
Differences in Regional Brain Volume
Gary J. Lewis1, Ryota Kanai2, Timothy C. Bates3, and Geraint Rees2
Abstract
■ Moral sentiment has been hypothesized to reflect evolved
adaptations to social living. If so, individual differences in
moral values may relate to regional variation in brain structure.
We tested this hypothesis in a sample of 70 young, healthy
adults examining whether differences on two major dimen-
sions of moral values were significantly associated with re-
gional gray matter volume. The two clusters of moral values
assessed were “individualizing” (values of harm/care and fair-
ness) and “binding” (deference to authority, in-group loyalty,
and purity/sanctity). Individualizing was positively associated
with left dorsomedial pFC volume and negatively associated
with bilateral precuneus volume. For binding, a significant
positive association was found for bilateral subcallosal gyrus
and a trend to significance for the left anterior insula volume.
These findings demonstrate that variation in moral sentiment
reflects individual differences in brain structure and suggest a
biological basis for moral sentiment, distributed across multi-
ple brain regions. ■
INTRODUCTION
Moral conduct is central to the well-being and cohesion
of societies, and thus delineating the origins of morality
represents both an important scientific and social goal.
Central constructs in the moral lexicon are harm reduction/
care and fairness/justice (Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1969),
alongside more recent additions such as sentiment con-
cerning deference to authority, loyalty to oneʼs in-group,
and concerns over purity/sanctity (Haidt & Graham,
2009; Haidt, 2007). With regards to the etiology of moral
sentiment and in contrast to social learning approaches
to moral behavior (Bandura, 1991), evolutionary models
suggest that these moral foundations reflect deep-rooted
adaptations to social living (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). With
this in mind, it is plausible that individual differences in
brain structure may reflect variation in moral sentiment.
Accordingly, in the current study, we sought to test this
hypothesis using voxel-based morphometry (VBM) in a
large sample of healthy, young adults.
Moral values are commonly conceived to relate to sen-
timent concerning the rights of the individual (Gilligan,
1982; Kohlberg, 1969). Indeed, neuroscientific research
seeking to uncover the neural bases of moral sentiment
has typically focused on these constructs, such as in the
runaway trolley paradigm, where participants are required
to make tradeoffs between harming a single individual to
save several others (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006)
and experimental economics games, which assess motiva-
tions concerning interpersonal fairness versus self-interest
(e.g., Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003).
Nonetheless, although benevolence and universalism are
uncontroversial components of the moral lexicon, recent
work has suggested that this framework is incomplete.
Drawing from cross-cultural studies of social and moral sys-
tems (e.g., Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Shweder, Mahapatra,
& Miller, 1987), Graham et al. (2011) argued that morality
extends “beyond the individual-based concerns of harm
and fairness, involving concerns about spiritual purity and
degradation (even for acts that involve no harm), concerns
about proper hierarchical role fulfillment, and moral
expectations of loyalty to the local or national group”
(p. 367).
With these observations in mind, Haidt and Graham
(2009) suggested that moral behavior varies according
to five core foundations: (1) harm (minimizing harm to
others), (2) fairness (maximizing fairness to all), (3) in-
group loyalty (the importance of the in-group), (4) author-
ity (respect for status and hierarchy), and (5) purity
(avoiding impure or disgusting acts/entities). Empirical
tests of these five moral foundations have provided psycho-
metric support for the structure of this model (Graham
et al., 2011): Confirmatory factor analyses supported a
five-correlated factors solution, although evidence for the
existence of two superordinate moral factors was also
noted: “individualizing”—the aggregate score on harm and
fairness, and “binding“—the aggregate score on authority,
in-group loyalty, and purity (Graham et al., 2009).
Theorizing within an evolutionary framework, Haidt
and Graham (2009) suggested that “natural selection
prepared the human mind to easily learn to detect and
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respond to (at least) five sets of patterns in the social
world” (pp. 380–381). If humans evolved a capacity to
detect and adhere to a small and specific set of social pat-
terns, the question arises as to which neural processes and
structures underlie this capacity. Whereas most prior neu-
roscience research has focused on deficits in moral reason-
ing in patients with brain lesions (Koenigs et al., 2007) or
functional activation correlates of moral sentiment or rea-
soning (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen,
2001), recent work has demonstrated that regional varia-
tion in brain volume is also linked to individual differences
in psychological traits (cf. Kanai & Rees, 2011). Utilizing this
volumetric approach, here we examined whether regional
variation in brain structure was associated with differences
on the two higher-order moral factors of “binding”—the
aggregate score of authority, in-group loyalty, and purity—
and “individualizing”—the aggregate score of harm and
fairness, as well as with these component factors (Graham
et al., 2011).
Although extensive work has examined the neural
bases of social cognition, no neuroscientific work to our
knowledge has directly addressed these particular moral
constructs. Moreover, of prior relevant work, it is appar-
ent that both individualizing and binding could each
plausibly be associated with similar neural correlates.
For example, insula cortex is active when others feel pain
(Saarela et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2006) and, as such, is
conceivably linked to individualizing. Insula function, how-
ever, is also associated with disgust sensitivity (Wright, He,
Shapira, Goodman, & Liu, 2004; Calder, Keane, Manes,
Antoun, & Young, 2000), an emotion closely related to pu-
rity (Rozin & Fallon, 1987), thus also linking this region
with binding. Similarly, the amygdala appears to play a role
in operant conditioning (Davis & Whalen, 2001), which in
turn plays an important role in normative behavior (Blair,
2007) and thus links this structure to binding. However,
Haruno and Frith (2010) have reported amygdala activa-
tion in situations where selfish acts are committed, po-
tentially linking this region with individualizing. Further
complicating matters, regions typically linked with menta-
lizing (e.g., medial pFC, temporal–parietal junction, tem-
poral poles; Amodio & Frith, 2006), thus facilitating
empathy, might at first thought appear to correspond
to individualizing; however, empathy is not necessarily
synonymous with sympathy (Decety & Michalska,
2010), and moral sentiments reflecting binding concerns
may also rely on the capacity to understand the mental
states of others. Finally, although much recent work has
examined the neural bases of social cognition (Amodio &
Frith, 2006), the vast majority of this research has in-
volved functional neuroimaging: Limited work to date
has assessed regional gray matter correlates of the social
mind, and it is not yet clear whether functional imaging
data correspond well to volumetric assessments (Kanai
& Rees, 2011).
In line with the limited directly relevant prior work in
this domain, as noted above, although we expected frontal
regions in particular to show links to our moral measures
(in line with extensive work linking these regions to social
cognition; Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Amodio & Frith,
2006), here we remained largely agnostic with regards to
specific regions, instead focusing our analyses on (partial)
whole-brain-corrected tests (see Methods for full detail).
We analyzed structural MRI volumes collected from a
large (n = 70) sample of healthy, young adults. We used
VBM methods to characterize any differences in regional
brain structure correlated with individual differences in




Seventy healthy participants (42 women; mean age =
24.6 ± 3.76 years) were recruited from the local commu-
nity of University College London. The study was approved
by the local ethics committee, and written informed con-
sent was obtained from all participants.
Moral Values Measures
Moral values were assessed using the 32-item Moral
Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) measuring harm/care,
fairness, in-group loyalty, authority deference, and purity/
sanctity, along with a two-item validity scale (Graham
et al., 2011). Examples of MFQ scale items are as follows:
“Compassion for those who are suffering is the most cru-
cial virtue” (Harm); “When the government makes laws,
the number one principle should be ensuring that every-
one is treated fairly” (Fairness); “It is more important to be
a team player than to express oneself” (In-group loyalty);
“Respect for authority is something all children need to
learn” (Authority); “People should not do things that are
disgusting, even if no one is harmed” (Purity). The MFQ
was administered on-line via a Web browser to facilitate
data storage and scoring.
MRI Data Acquisition
MR images were acquired on a 1.5-T Siemens Sonata
MRI scanner (Siemens Medical, Erlangen, Germany).
High-resolution anatomical images were acquired using
a T1-weighted 3-D modified driven equilibrium Fourier
transform sequence (repetition time = 12.24 msec; echo
time = 3.56 msec; field of view = 256 × 256 mm; voxel
size = 1 × 1 × 1 mm).
VBM
The MR images were first segmented for gray matter and
white matter using the segmentation tools in SPM8 (www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Subsequently, we performed Dif-
feomorphic Anatomical Registration through Exponen-
tiated Lie Algebra in SPM8 for intersubject registration
of the gray matter images. To ensure that local gray matter
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volumes were conserved after spatial transformation, the
image intensity of each voxel was modulated by the
Jacobian determinants of the deformation fields. Regis-
tered images were then smoothed with a Gaussian kernel
(FWHM = 8 mm) and transformed to Montreal Neurolo-
gical Institute (MNI) stereotactic space using affine and
nonlinear spatial normalization implemented in SPM8
for multiple regression analysis.
The gender and age of the participants as well as
whole-brain gray matter volume were included as covari-
ates in the design matrix, thus regressing out effects cor-
related with these variables. We conducted all statistical
analyses using a mask volume that comprised the entire
brain with the exception of the cerebellum and the occi-
pital lobe, which were excluded from analysis. The mask
volume was constructed from a probabilistic MNI struc-
tural atlas (Mazziotta et al., 2001). Within this mask vo-
lume, clusters were initially identified as contiguous
groups of voxels that exceeded an uncorrected threshold
of voxel-wise p < .001. We then employed a threshold of
p(corr) < .05 corrected for multiple comparisons across
the entire mask volume at a cluster level using nonsta-
tionary correction (Hayasaka, Phan, Liberzon, Worsley,
& Nichols, 2004) to identify regions in which gray matter
volume significantly correlated with moral values.
RESULTS
Binding: VBM Correlates
Binding was positively and significantly correlated with the
gray matter volume of bilateral subcallosal gyrus [p(corr) <
.01, r= 0.57, t(65) = 5.56] and marginally with gray matter
volume of the left anterior insula [p(corr) = .057, r= 0.45,
t(65) = 4.03; see Table 1 and Figure 1]. We did not find any
cluster that exhibited a significant (corrected) negative cor-
relation with binding.
Binding Subscales: VBM Correlates
Within the subscales of the binding foundations, Author-
ity scores were positively correlated with the gray matter
volume of bilateral subcallosal gyrus [p(corr) < .01, r =
0.49, t(65) = 4.51; see Figure 1]. The Purity score also
correlated significantly with the same region of bilateral
subcallosal cortex [p(corr) < .01, r = 0.55, t(65) =
5.32] and with gray matter volume of the left anterior in-
sula [left insula, p(corr) = .04, r = 0.45, t(65) = 4.01; see
Figure 1]. The Purity score exhibited a trend of correla-
tion with gray matter volume of the right insula, but this
was not significant [p(corr) = .10, r = 0.44, t(65) = 3.96].
Items related to feelings of disgust primarily drove the cor-
relation in the right insula with purity: The right anterior
Table 1. Summary of the Gray Matter Volume Associations with Moral Values






(mm3) p(corr)X Y Z
Binding Subcallosal gyrus L/R −14 10 −24 0.57 5.56 7854 <.01**
Anterior insula L −46 0 1 0.45 4.03 1110 .057 ns
Authority Subcallosal gyrus L/R 16 12 −15 0.49 4.51 6581 <.01**
Purity Subcallosal gyrus L/R −15 20 −21 0.55 5.32 6891 <.01**
Anterior insula L −44 11 6 0.45 4.01 1417 .04*
Anterior insula R 45 12 12 0.44 3.96 1667 .10 ns
Disgust (part of purity) Anterior insula R 42 13 9 0.48 4.36 3605 <.01**
In-group Anterior insula L −52 −1 1 0.40 3.49 3510 .20 ns
Individualizing DMPFC L −8 44 43 0.47 4.33 813 .04*
Precuneus L/R 9 −42 45 −0.47 4.32 759 .07 ns
Harm/care Precuneus L/R 10 −45 46 −0.47 4.30 2204 .03*
Postcentral gyrus L −64 −16 33 −0.52 4.86 1623 .04*
DMPFC L −8 44 43 0.43 3.87 283 .30 ns
Fairness DMPFC L −9 44 42 0.44 3.91 283 .058 ns
p(corr) denotes the p values corrected for multiple comparison at the cluster level across the VOI (see Methods for details). Significant results
are denoted by asterisks; ns indicates nonsignificant results. DMPFC = dorsomedial pFC; H = hemisphere; L = left; R = right; L/R = left and
right.
*p < .05, corrected.
**p < .01, corrected.
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insula was significantly correlated with the sum score of the
disgust-only items [p(corr) = .01, r = 0.48, t(65) = 4.36].
We did not find any brain region whose gray matter
volume significantly correlated with in-group loyalty: The
numerically highest correlation was found in the left ante-
rior insula, but this did not survive correction [p(corr) =
.20, r = 0.40, t(65) = 3.49].
Individualizing: VBM Correlates
Individualizing was positively correlated with gray matter
volume of the left dorsomedial pFC [DMPFC; p(corr) =
.04, r = 0.47, t(65) = 4.33; see Table 1 and Figure 2] and
showed a marginal negative correlation with precuneus
[p(corr) = .077, r = −0.47, t(65) = 4.32].
Individualizing Subscales: VBM Correlates
Harm/care showed a significant negative correlation with
the gray matter volume of the precuneus [p(corr) = .03,
r=−0.47, t(65) = 4.30] and left postcentral gyrus [somato-
sensory cortex; p(corr) = .04, r=−0.52, t(65) = 4.86; see
Figure 2]. Harm/care showed the same positive effect
for DMPFC volume as for the overall individualizing do-
main, but this did not reach corrected levels of significant
[p(corr) = .30, r = 0.43, t(65) = 3.87]. Fairness also
showed a trend of positive correlation with the DMPFC
[p(corr) = .058, r = 0.44, t(65) = 3.91; see Figure 2].
Political Orientation and Individualizing/Binding
Both individualizing and binding are associated with politi-
cal orientation (Lewis & Bates, 2011; Graham et al., 2009).
To examine their relationship in our current data set, we
therefore also generated statistical overlays showing brain
regions associated with political orientation reported in a
previous study (Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011: see
Supplementary Figure 1) together with regions associated
with individualizing and binding. These data are reported
in full in the Supplementary Materials. In summary, how-
ever, no common brain region was observed linking the
moral domains and political orientation.
DISCUSSION
The current study, utilizing a large sample of young,
healthy adults, is the first (to our knowledge) to report
associations between regional brain volumes and moral
values. The findings indicate that scores on individualiz-
ing (sensitivity to harm/care and fairness) and binding
(reflecting in-group loyalty, deference to authority, and
concerns about purity) are associated with specific brain
structures, supporting the idea that these regions con-
stitute an evolved substrate assisting the detection and
adherence to each of a core set of social patterns. Spe-
cifically, here we find evidence for a positive association
Figure 1. Regions where gray
matter volume was associated
with binding (A), authority (B),
purity/sanctity (C), and in-group
loyalty (D) values are overlaid
on a T1-weighted standard
MNI template (Collins et al.,
1998); x, y, and z values
denote the position of the
sagittal, coronal, and transverse
slices, respectively; t values
are overlaid for regions that
showed significant positive
correlation in the VBM
analyses (see the main text
and Table 1). The overlays
are thresholded at p < .01
(uncorrected for display
purposes). The color bar
illustrates the corresponding
t values.
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between individualizing and left DMPFC volume and a
(marginal) negative association with bilateral precuneus
volume. We also observed a positive association between
binding and bilateral subcallosal gyrus volume as well as
a (marginal) positive association with left anterior insula
volume.
The specific associations reported here are broadly
consistent with previous research on affective and socio-
cognitive processing. For example, the insula is typically
activated during the processing of disgust stimuli (Wright
et al., 2004), and lesions to this area create deficits in the
detection and experience of disgust (Calder et al., 2000).
Positive association of anterior insula volume to purity
may suggest, then, that this disgust substrate also influ-
ences responses in the moral domain of binding; however,
it should be borne in mind that the insula is associated with
multiple psychological processes (cf. Menon & Uddin,
2010; Craig, 2009) that may also account for this pattern
of association. Similarly, the finding that DMPFC and pre-
cuneus volumes were significantly associated with themor-
al values of harm/care and fairness suggests that the
functions of mentalizing/empathy processing previously
associated with these regions (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003;
Greene et al., 2001; Gallagher et al., 2000) may be linked
to differences in the moral domain of concern for the indi-
vidual, although further work establishing direction of
causality is required.
The (negative) association between left postcentral
gyrus (somatosensory cortex) volume and the subscale
harm/care are in keeping with recent work indicating a
common-coding somatosensory system for self- and
other-representation (Bufalari, Aprile, Avenanti, Di Russo,
& Aglioti, 2007; Lamm, Fischer, & Decety, 2007), which
may facilitate empathy for other conspecifics. In contrast,
the association of subcallosal gyrus volume with binding
does not obviously reflect findings from previous work
in the social and moral neuroscience literature and thus
represents a novel behavioral correlate for this brain
region.
Although the anatomical correlates outlined above
provide insights into the biological bases of human sen-
sitivity to important social and moral patterns, they also
highlight additional research questions. First, it is un-
clear, at a mechanistic level, why individual differences
in brain volume should correlate with psychological traits
in general (cf. Kanai & Rees, 2011) and, now, in moral
traits more specifically. Moreover, we observed a positive
association between DMPFC volume and individualizing,
but a negative association between precuneus volume
and individualizing. With regards to gray matter corre-
lates in general, it is possible that greater volume reflects
enhanced computational efficiency, perhaps as a function
of greater neuronal density (Kanai & Rees, 2011). How-
ever, although this interpretation can account for positive
associations, it is less clear how to account for negative
associations, such as that observed here with individualiz-
ing and precuneus volume: One possibility is that re-
duced volume reflects efficient cortical pruning (i.e.,
the removal of redundant synapses and neurons), which
in turn can also generate increased computational effi-
ciency. Determining the precise mechanisms underlying
the correlation between brain structure and moral con-
cerns reported here, though, remains beyond the scope
of these data, although such work will be valuable and
thus is recommended.
Second, with the current design, we are not able to de-
termine the direction of causality underlying the observed
relationships between brain structure and moral values.
Figure 2. Regions where gray
matter volume was associated
with individualizing (A), harm/
care (B), and fairness (C) values
are overlaid on a T1-weighted
standard MNI template
(Collins et al., 1998); x, y, and
z values denote the position
of sagittal, coronal, and
transverse slices, respectively;




with their respective moral
value trait in the VBM
analysis (see the main text
and Table 1). The overlays
are thresholded at p < .01
(uncorrected for display
purposes). The color bars
illustrate the corresponding
t values.
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Future work utilizing genetically informative designs, such
as the classical twin study or discordant twin design (Martin,
Boomsma, & Machin, 1997), may help to resolve this issue,
as has been demonstrated in studies of brain volume and
general intelligence (Toga & Thompson, 2005). In ad-
dition, longitudinal studies of brain development and
change will also be valuable to further tease apart the direc-
tion of causal influences underlying such associations
(Hedman, van Haren, Schnack, Kahn, & Hulshoff Pol,
2011). Third, whereas prior work has robustly linked the
moral domains of binding and individualizing to political
orientation (e.g., Lewis & Bates, 2011; Graham et al., 2009),
the current study identified a distinct pattern of gray matter
correlates for these moral domains than those recently iden-
tified for political orientation (i.e., the amygdala and ACC;
Kanai et al., 2011: also see Supplementary Materials). This
disparity may reflect a lack of statistical power to detect
modest common effects, although associations between
political orientation and both individualizing and binding
are typically moderate (i.e., some way from unity; e.g.,
Lewis & Bates, 2011) and so the current results may reflect
distinct neural correlates for moral values from those
underlying political orientation. Further work in larger
samples, along with more targeted hypotheses (in line with
findings reported here), is recommended.
Some relevant brain regions, such as the ACC (with prior
links to fairness; e.g., Singer et al., 2006), did not show sig-
nificant associations to any of the traits examined in this
study. Limited power (particularly as we performed near
whole-brain corrected analyses) to detect weak associa-
tions may be one explanation for this null finding. In addi-
tion, we examined only young adults: As regional brain
volumes change throughout life (Gogtay et al., 2004; Good
et al., 2001), it is not possible to determine whether the
associations detected here generalize to other age or socio-
demographic groups. Finally, it is also possible that for
some regions, functional activation is not reflected in struc-
tural differences (or vice versa), at least with regards to
macroscopic volume. Understanding which functions are
linked to individual differences in gray matter volume
and which are not, in a systematic and principled way,
would thus be of great value.
In summary, we examined whether individual differ-
ences in regional brain volume were predictive of variation
in moral values. Several brain regions were significantly as-
sociated with moral values, including the dorsomedial pFC
and precuneus to values concerning harm reduction and
fairness, and insula cortex and subcallosal gyrus to values
concerning purity and authority deference. These findings
demonstrate that variation in moral sentiment corresponds
to individual differences in brain structure and suggest that
moral values possess deep-rooted biological bases distrib-
uted across distinct brain regions.
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